Working Papers
Loyalists Today, Rivals Tomorrow: A Dynamic Model of Elite Purges
[Slides] (Draft available upon request)
The paper proposes a dynamic model of elite purges in an authoritarian context. While the existing literature focuses on the dyadic relationship between the dictator and the ruling coalition, this paper decomposes the ruling coalition into individual members to emphasize the existence of intra-elite competition underneath the tension between the dictator and their subordinates. Moreover, the paper contends that while purges can be commanded by the dictator, the execution rests upon the compliance of a loyal elite. With these mechanisms in play, the paper captures how the two dynamics interconnect, and how both the dictator and the elite can exploit the act of purging to further their goals. The paper finds that purging is only a successful tool to a dictator when there is an alignment of incentives between the dictator and the elite. The foundation of this alignment lies in the fact a threatening challenger is a common enemy, as both the dictator and other elites fear the heavy power imbalance. A core tension arises, however, as dynamic interactions enter. By tasking an elite to purge another member, dictators risk transforming the elite into the future threat. As a result, elites entrusted to purge may themselves face the possibility of removal. Through this dynamic, the paper provides the necessary circumstances in which purges occur and also analyzes conditions that can facilitate them.
The paper proposes a dynamic model of elite purges in an authoritarian context. While the existing literature focuses on the dyadic relationship between the dictator and the ruling coalition, this paper decomposes the ruling coalition into individual members to emphasize the existence of intra-elite competition underneath the tension between the dictator and their subordinates. Moreover, the paper contends that while purges can be commanded by the dictator, the execution rests upon the compliance of a loyal elite. With these mechanisms in play, the paper captures how the two dynamics interconnect, and how both the dictator and the elite can exploit the act of purging to further their goals. The paper finds that purging is only a successful tool to a dictator when there is an alignment of incentives between the dictator and the elite. The foundation of this alignment lies in the fact a threatening challenger is a common enemy, as both the dictator and other elites fear the heavy power imbalance. A core tension arises, however, as dynamic interactions enter. By tasking an elite to purge another member, dictators risk transforming the elite into the future threat. As a result, elites entrusted to purge may themselves face the possibility of removal. Through this dynamic, the paper provides the necessary circumstances in which purges occur and also analyzes conditions that can facilitate them.
Balancing the Ruling Coalition: A Model of Authoritarian Power Sharing
(Draft available upon request)
Authoritarian regimes are typically shrouded with chaos once an incumbent dictator is removed. The existing ruling coalition faces the problem of succession which, absent formal institutions, is plagued with years of political conflict. I focus on this phenomenon to study the power-sharing dynamics between the dictator and the ruling elites. Through a formal model, I show how dictators can thrive by exploiting the consequences of their removal. I find that because political elites must engage in costly infighting following a successful coup, even a dictator who is powerless to the ruling coalition can maintain power while simultaneously obtaining a significant portion of the nation’s spoils. Moreover, this result does not depend on the elites’ capabilities to coordinate. I also obtain novel insights on the impact of the quality of elites on the dictator’s success: competent subordinates threaten the dictator, but simultaneously reduce the bargaining power of other subordinates. Finally, I find that the optimal power distribution within the ruling coalition varies with the strength of the dictator, and both weak and strong dictators will prefer asymmetric distributions of power. These results suggest that the consequences of leadership removal may be just as important as the threat of removal itself and should not be ignored when studying elite-level dynamics in authoritarian regimes.
Authoritarian regimes are typically shrouded with chaos once an incumbent dictator is removed. The existing ruling coalition faces the problem of succession which, absent formal institutions, is plagued with years of political conflict. I focus on this phenomenon to study the power-sharing dynamics between the dictator and the ruling elites. Through a formal model, I show how dictators can thrive by exploiting the consequences of their removal. I find that because political elites must engage in costly infighting following a successful coup, even a dictator who is powerless to the ruling coalition can maintain power while simultaneously obtaining a significant portion of the nation’s spoils. Moreover, this result does not depend on the elites’ capabilities to coordinate. I also obtain novel insights on the impact of the quality of elites on the dictator’s success: competent subordinates threaten the dictator, but simultaneously reduce the bargaining power of other subordinates. Finally, I find that the optimal power distribution within the ruling coalition varies with the strength of the dictator, and both weak and strong dictators will prefer asymmetric distributions of power. These results suggest that the consequences of leadership removal may be just as important as the threat of removal itself and should not be ignored when studying elite-level dynamics in authoritarian regimes.
Sacrificing for your Nation: A Model of Social Identity and Autocratic Politics
How does a strong national identity provide authoritarian regimes with more stability? This paper uses a formal model to examine the importance of a national identity under an autocratic setting. While economic elites prefer to retain their wealth and suppress the poor’s redistributive desires, they live in constant fear of a revolution. To offset this threat and keep the masses in check, some form of redistribution is re- quired. Moreover, the poor also possess the ability to choose their own social identity. Incorporating aspects of social psychology, this paper shows that while class-based identification will always make the poor demand higher levels of redistribution, they will tolerate lower levels of redistribution under a national identity. Interestingly, this paper finds that although a class-based identification will always lead to an uprising under certain conditions, if a national identity is attractive enough, forward looking elites can exploit this identity and set a level of redistribution that will induce nation-based identification. In turn, this may co-opt potential revolters, thus allowing the regime to avert an uprising. Together, this paper shows that a strong national identity benefits the regime not only by relieving redistributive pressures, but also as a deterrent for a class-based identification that may otherwise lead to the regime’s collapse.